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Savagism and civilization: the Iranun, globalization and the literature of Joseph Conrad

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Savagism and civilization: the Iranun, globalization and the literature of Joseph Conrad

J.F. Warren’s 2001 article in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society examines the Iranun maritime raiders of the Sulu–Mindanao region from the late eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth century, arguing that their so-called “piracy” was not a symptom of cultural savagism or civilizational decline but a rational, state-sanctioned response to the integration of the Sulu sultanate into the emerging global capitalist economy. Warren further demonstrates how the dehumanizing “moro/Illanun” stereotype was systematically constructed in colonial official discourse and perpetuated in the fiction of Joseph Conrad, whose Indonesian novels drew on the same imperial sources—Raffles, Brooke, Royal Navy captains—that had justified the conquest and erasure of the Iranun as a people.

Summary

Warren’s central intervention is to reframe Iranun maritime raiding within a cross-regional hemispheric framework of globalization. The article traces how the opening of the China trade to European merchants in the 1770s and 1780s created an insatiable demand for exotic commodities—sea cucumber, birds’ nests, camphor, rattans—that the Sulu sultanate could only supply through the forced labour of tens of thousands of captives. The Iranun, under Taosug sponsorship, were the mobile military arm of this redistributive economy. Their raiding was not the desperate lashing-out of a decadent society, as Raffles and Brooke claimed, but the operational logic of a trading state competing in a global market. Warren shows that the British East India Company itself was complicit, selling arms and opium to the Iranun as a tacit privateering system to undermine Dutch competitors in the Moluccas and Sulawesi, before turning to condemn the very people it had armed once they became ungovernable.

The second half of the article turns to literary representation. Warren argues that Conrad, despite his brief nineteen weeks aboard the SS Vidar in the Celebes Sea, had no genuine first-hand knowledge of the Iranun and relied instead on the colonial ethnographic corpus of Raffles, Brooke, Belcher and Keppel. In The Rescue, Almayer’s Folly and An Outcast of the Islands, Conrad’s “Illanun” characters—Daman, Babalatchi, Omar el Badavi—are rendered through the lens of the Spanish reconquista “moro” image: bloodthirsty, fanatical, inherently savage. Warren reads these novels as instruments of what he calls “linguistic reappropriation,” in which the Anglo-Saxon imperial project is naturalized through the binary of civilization versus savagism. The Iranun, in Conrad’s fiction, are destined to be eliminated by superior British moral values, technology and juridical processes—a narrative that served to legitimize the final Spanish and British conquest of the Sulu zone.

Throughout, Warren draws on Spanish colonial chronicles (Barrantes, Bernaldez, Montero y Vidal), British Admiralty and East India Company records, Brooke’s journals, and oral traditions preserved among descendant communities in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. The article’s method is to hold the colonial literary and administrative record against the material evidence of the global economy, exposing the ideological function of the “piracy” label.

Key Findings

  • Between 1774 and 1798, an estimated 150–200 raiding vessels departed annually from the Mindanao–Sulu area; the largest lanong exceeded 130 feet in length (p. 65).
  • A Bugis chronicler recorded Iranun double-decked prahus of 90–100 feet, rowed by more than a hundred slaves and armed with bronze swivel cannon, operating in the Strait of Malacca and Riau Islands (p. 43).
  • Colonial authorities in Singapore and the Straits Settlements designated August, September and October as musim lanun (“Lanun season”) due to the regularity of raids during those months (p. 44).
  • Estimated annual losses from maritime raiding reached several million pounds sterling; most cargo insurers, including Lloyds, were effectively helpless against the onslaught (p. 53).
  • Conrad’s only maritime exposure to the region was nineteen weeks as first mate on the SS Vidar, a Singapore-based Arab-owned steamer in the Celebes Sea; his knowledge of the Iranun was derived from port gossip and published colonial accounts rather than direct contact (p. 59).
  • The last Iranun stronghold at Tungku on the east coast of Borneo fell in 1878; Spanish naval campaigns against the Iranun began after 1848 and culminated in the late 1880s with the occupation of the old ruling families of Mindanao (pp. 54, 57).

Conclusion

Warren’s definitive historical takeaway is that the Iranun were neither savages nor the product of civilizational decay but highly adaptive maritime communities whose raiding and slaving constituted a vital component of the Sulu sultanate’s participation in the global economy. The “savagism versus civilization” narrative, he argues, was an ideological construction—forged in Spanish colonial theology, refined in British imperial prose, and immortalized in Conrad’s fiction—that served to naturalize the dispossession and erasure of the Iranun as a people and to obscure the complicity of European powers in creating the very conditions that made large-scale maritime raiding both possible and profitable.

Context

  • Primary archival and documentary sources include British Admiralty Records (125/133, Sulu Piracy), East India Company Straits Settlement Factory Records, Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons, 1852), Spanish colonial chronicles (Barrantes 1878; Bernaldez 1857; Montero y Vidal 1888), and Brooke’s published journals (Mundy 1848).
  • Historiographically, the article extends Warren’s own earlier work on the Sulu Zone (1981, 1998) by explicitly linking ethnohistorical analysis with postcolonial literary criticism, challenging the long-standing orthodoxy—articulated by Raffles, Brooke and Conrad—that “piracy” signified the decline of the Malayo-Muslim world rather than its integration into global capitalism.

References