Political and historical notes on the old Sulu Sultanate
Cesar Adib Majul’s 1965 article examines the political institutions of the Sulu Sultanate from its fourteenth-century origins through its reduction to a figurehead under American rule, arguing that the sultanate was neither the despotic Islamic state assumed by European observers nor a mere rubber stamp for the datus, but rather a working compromise between pre-Islamic social structures and the classical institution of the sultanate. The article was prompted by the Philippine claim on North Borneo (Sabah), which demanded clarification of how the sultan acquired, administered, and ceded that territory.
Summary
Majul’s central argument is that the Sulu Sultanate developed as a hybrid political formation in which Islamic institutions were layered onto, rather than replacing, a pre-existing social order of independent datus (chieftains) who commanded followers, slaves, and inherited prestige. The sultan, while theoretically the highest political and religious authority over dar-al-islam, could not appoint panglimas (territorial governors) or enact laws without the consent of the Ruma Bichara, a council composed of the most powerful and wealthy datus. This council controlled decisions on war, taxation, the appointment of officials, and the approval of treaties with foreign powers. Majul demonstrates through a series of historical episodes—ranging from the 1638 Corcuera expedition to the 1878 cession of North Borneo—that the sultan’s effective power fluctuated with his personal strength, the size of his following, and the degree of cohesion among the datus.
The article traces the genesis of the sultanate through the Sulu Tarsila (royal genealogy), which narrates how the Arab sherif Abu Bakr el-Hashimi married the daughter of the Moslem prince Raja Baginda, succeeded to his datuship, and proclaimed himself sultan. The resulting “working arrangement” limited the sultan’s direct land ownership to the area within hearing distance of his gong, while the datus retained their traditional territories. This foundational compromise explains the persistent tension between Shari’a (which the sultan guarded) and adat (customary law, which the datus upheld), and why the sultan’s claim to cede or lease territory rested on the theoretical principle that all land belonged to him as sultan.
Majul also addresses the succession mechanism, showing that the sultan nominated a successor in his will, but the Ruma Bichara could confirm or reject this nomination. The case of Sultan Muhammed Alim-ud-din I, who was imprisoned in Manila from 1748 to 1764, illustrates the fluidity of political obedience: his brother Bantilan was proclaimed sultan (as Muiz-ud-din) during the captivity, yet upon Alim-ud-din’s return, he was once again recognized as sultan and Bantilan’s line withdrew. The article concludes with the progressive erosion of the sultanate under Spanish protectorate arrangements (1878) and American administration, culminating in the Carpenter Agreement of 1915, after which the sultan retained only a voluntary religious function.
Key Findings
- The Ruma Bichara varied in size from six members (under Sultan Aliy-ud-din, c. 1800) to between fifteen and nineteen by the late nineteenth century; the sultan held two votes, and the raja-muda (heir-apparent) held two additional votes provided he voted with the sultan (pp. 32–33).
- In 1775, Datu Taiting’s raid on Balambangan yielded approximately one million Spanish dollars in booty; the sultan received all captured artillery, muskets, and powder as his right, plus personal gifts in cash and goods, despite disclaiming responsibility for the expedition (p. 30).
- The 1884 election of Sultan Muhammed Amir-ul-Kiram at Maibung was certified by twelve datus, sixteen sherifs, and approximately twenty-seven panglimas, maharajas, and orangkayas; a rival election at Patikul for Datu Aliy-ud-din was signed by eleven datus, thirteen sherifs, and about thirty-five minor officials (p. 34).
- The 1845 French negotiation for Basilan resulted in the Ruma Bichara agreeing to a one-hundred-year lease at a rate of one hundred pesos in silver on the first day of occupation, conditional on the French occupying the island within six months (p. 30).
- In 1848, Datu Tampan defied both the sultan and the Ruma Bichara’s refusal of permission to raid Spanish-held territories, fortifying an island in the Balanguingi group and acting independently until defeated by Spanish forces from Basilan (p. 41).
- The 1878 appointment of Baron de Overbeck as datu bandahara and rajah of Sandakan by Sultan Muhammed Jamal-ul-A’lam delegated to him the power of life and death over the inhabitants of North Borneo, while as datu he owed tribute to the sultan (p. 28).
Conclusion
Majul’s definitive takeaway is that the Sulu Sultanate was best understood as a “feudal oligarchy” in which the sultan’s authority was real but structurally constrained by the collective power of the datus through the Ruma Bichara. The sultan’s ultimate source of legitimacy lay not in Islamic jurisprudence alone but in his capacity to coordinate resistance against foreign invaders and to embody the integrity of Sulu as part of dar-al-islam. Once that protective function was undermined by Spanish and then American intervention, the sultanate lost its political coherence, and the datus reverted to their independent positions.
Context
- The article draws on Spanish colonial sources (Combes, Colin, Gainza, Gerin, Santayana, Barrantes, Montero y Vidal, Espina), English and American accounts (Forrest, Dalrymple, Hunt, Wilkes), Najeeb Saleeby’s History of Sulu (1908), and the Sulu Tarsila itself.
- Historiographically, Majul positions his work as a supplement to Melvin Mednick’s 1957 exploratory article in the Philippine Sociological Review, providing the historical illustrations that Mednick’s framework required, and correcting both the European tendency to characterize the sultan as despotic and the opposite extreme of reducing him to a cipher.