Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735–1773
H. de la Costa, S.J., published this article in 1965 in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (Vol. 38, pp. 43–76), drawing on Jesuit provincial archives, East India Company records, and Spanish colonial documents to reconstruct the reign of Sultan Muhammad Alimuddin I of Sulu (1735–1773). The overarching thesis is that Alimuddin was a capable but ultimately indecisive ruler whose personal fascination with Christianity and the competing imperial ambitions of Spain and Britain conspired to destabilize his sultanate and reshape its territorial integrity.
Summary
Alimuddin succeeded his elder brother Nasaruddin in 1735, having spent formative years among an Arab community in Batavia where he acquired Arabic, Malay, and Islamic scholarship (p. 43). From the outset he pursued centralizing reforms—organizing a standing army and navy independent of feudal levies, coining state currency, and beginning the codification of Koranic and customary law (p. 44). His diplomatic overtures to Spain culminated in the Treaty of 1737, which de la Costa emphasizes was a treaty between two sovereign and independent states, a distinction with critical consequences for later territorial disputes (p. 43). The treaty enabled a punitive joint expedition against the Orang Tedong in 1739, in which Alimuddin mustered 8,000 men (p. 44).
The most consequential episode of Alimuddin’s reign was his engagement with the Jesuit mission. In 1747 he granted the Jesuits permission to preach in his dominions and even allowed his heir, Muhammad Israel, to receive Christian instruction (p. 45). The mission at Booboo, just outside Jolo, provoked fierce opposition from the datus, who feared it was a prelude to Spanish conquest. Alimuddin was forced to relocate the missionaries into his own palace compound, a move that alienated both the missionaries and his aristocracy (p. 46). When he was wounded in an ambush—likely by agents of his younger brother Bantilan—he fled to Basilan in September 1748, and Bantilan promptly dissolved the regency and proclaimed himself Sultan Muhammad Mu’izzuddin (pp. 47–48).
Alimuddin’s subsequent flight to Manila and his request for baptism in April 1749 became a sensation in the Spanish colony, celebrated with days of festivities (p. 50). Yet his conversion—whether sincere or political—rendered him unacceptable to his own people as a Muslim ruler. The Spanish governor Ovando, upon discovering that Alimuddin had written to the Sultan of Magindanao in Arabic stating he was “under foreign dominion” and “compelled to obey,” arrested him and 217 Sulu subjects, branding them for slavery and ordering the destruction of Sulu towns (p. 54). The British capture of Manila in 1762 during the Seven Years’ War created a new opportunity: Alimuddin, now a prisoner of the British, negotiated a treaty with Governor Drake in February 1763 ceding land for a factory and confirming Dalrymple’s earlier arrangements with Mu’izzuddin (p. 59). When the Treaty of Paris restored the Philippines to Spain, Dalrymple—now acting governor—engineered Alimuddin’s restoration to Jolo in May 1764, first securing a Ruma Bechara resolution voiding all treaties Alimuddin had made during his captivity, then obtaining from the restored sultan a cession of all Sulu territories in northern Borneo and southern Palawan to the East India Company, explicitly framed as a sale that was “irredeemable” (pp. 63–65).
Key Findings
- The Treaty of 1737 between Sulu and Spain was a genuine treaty between two sovereign states, not a tributary arrangement, a legal distinction Dalrymple later exploited to counter Spanish claims of paramountcy over Sulu (pp. 43, 67).
- Alimuddin’s 1744 “tribute mission” to China was in reality a trade mission, consistent with the Qing court’s diplomatic fiction that only vassals sent tribute (p. 44).
- The Jesuit mission at Jolo (1747–1748) failed because the Sulu aristocracy interpreted it as the first step toward Spanish annexation; the missionaries were expelled within a week of Alimuddin’s departure (pp. 46–47).
- Governor Ovando’s 1751 manifesto ordered the branding of all Sulu captives on the face, their reduction to slavery regardless of rank, and the destruction of Sulu towns—a declaration of total war against the sultanate (p. 54).
- Dalrymple’s 1764 cession document, signed by Alimuddin I and countersigned by his sons Israel, Sharifuddin, and Ja’far, transferred all Sulu territory from “Towson Abai to Kumannus” in Borneo plus Palawan to the East India Company by way of sale (p. 76).
- Alimuddin abdicated in favour of Muhammad Israel in 1773; the year of his death is unknown but cannot have been much later (p. 70).
Conclusion
De la Costa’s definitive assessment is that Alimuddin was “a highly intelligent and sensitive individual, capable of conceiving large views on the government of his realm, but somewhat lacking in the resolution of will and the practical grasp of affairs necessary to carry them into effect” (p. 70). His reign exemplifies how European imperial competition fractured the political autonomy of small Southeast Asian Muslim states, which Western historiography had previously reduced to “merely piratical commonwealths” of interest only for their “nuisance value” (p. 71).
Context
- The article draws substantially on the Jesuit Province of Tarragona archives (JAT) and the East India Company’s Home Miscellaneous Series and Factory Records, Borneo, both held in the India Office Library, London—collections that were not available to Saleeby, whose 1908 History of Sulu remains the baseline work.
- The cession documents reproduced in the appendices (particularly Appendix D, the 2 July 1764 cession) became foundational legal instruments in the East India Company’s subsequent claims to North Borneo, which eventually led to the establishment of British North Borneo under the Borneo Company.