Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915: the Sultan’s ‘double game’
Cheah Boon Kheng’s 1995 article in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society re-examines the 1915 Pasir Putih rebellion in Kelantan, arguing that Sultan Mohamed IV did not simply comply with British authority but instead played a calculated “double game”—publicly endorsing the British Adviser’s military suppression while privately sympathising with the rebels’ grievances over land taxation and district officer misconduct. Drawing on British Colonial Office records, the British Adviser’s files, and a private diary, Cheah demonstrates how the Sultan’s ambivalent strategies ultimately secured the ouster of British Adviser W. Langham-Carter.
Summary
The article challenges the prevailing scholarly narrative that portrayed the Sultan of Kelantan as a pliant, pro-British collaborator during the 1915 rising. Cheah argues that previous studies—whether based on British Colonial Office records (Allen), local semi-oral accounts (which frame the rebellion as derhaka, i.e., treason against the Sultan), or peasant-focused interpretations (Ibrahim Nik Mahmood, Tan Ban Teik)—have all failed to register the significant conflict between the Sultan and his British Adviser, W. Langham-Carter. The core of Cheah’s argument is that the Sultan’s behaviour was best understood as “ambivalence” rather than simple compliance or open rebellion: he alternated between cooperation and obstruction, issuing draconian proclamations against the rebels while simultaneously delaying the British military advance and expressing sympathy for the peasants’ tax grievances (pp. 12–13, 23).
The narrative is driven by a close reading of competing British official reports—those of the British Adviser Langham-Carter, the political officer R.J. Farrer, the Acting Colonial Secretary W.G. Maxwell, and the commanding officer Col. Brownlow—which reveal a spectrum of suspicion toward the Sultan. Farrer and Langham-Carter accused the Sultan of minimising the threat and concocting intelligence to delay the British force, while Col. Brownlow’s military report and Maxwell’s published narrative present a more neutral account. Cheah shows that the Sultan anticipated these negative reports and strategically dispatched his Malay ministers to Singapore on 17 May to present his version directly to Governor Sir Arthur Young, thereby neutralising the damaging allegations before they reached the Governor’s desk (pp. 20–22). The primary sources also include the private diary of A.G. Morkill, a former magistrate in Kelantan, and the long poem Riwayat Terengganu Daruliman by the court poetess Tengku Dalam Kalthum, which together illuminate the Sultan of Terengganu’s visit to Kelantan during the crisis and the political calculations behind it (pp. 9–11).
A secondary thread of the article traces the consequences of the Sultan’s victory over Langham-Carter to the later Terengganu revolts of 1925 and 1928. Cheah suggests that the Kelantan precedent—where a Malay ruler successfully manipulated British officials to remove an unpopular Adviser—may have emboldened the Terengganu court, particularly Tengku Muhammad, in his own failed attempt to oust British Adviser W.L. Humphreys in 1919–1920 (pp. 31–32).
Key Findings
- The rebellion broke out on 29 April 1915 in Pasir Putih district; British troops from Singapore arrived in Kota Bahru on 5 May and reached Pasir Putih on 9 May, encountering no organised resistance (pp. 9, 17).
- The Sultan’s ministers reported rebel strength at 3,900 men across six positions with approximately 400 guns (150 muzzle-loaders, the rest breech-loaders); Col. Brownlow’s force consisted of 200 regulars plus Malay Volunteers (pp. 18–19).
- A punitive fine was imposed on all households in Pasir Putih: $10 for a large house, $5 for medium, $3 for small, with houses to be burned if unpaid within 15 days. The fine originated from Langham-Carter’s minute of 21 May 1915 proposing $3 per house, but the Sultan raised the rates (pp. 24–26).
- The Sultan petitioned three times to have Langham-Carter replaced: in March 1915, again on 4 July 1915 (nominating R.J. Farrer), and definitively in February 1916, stating “Mr Langham-Carter should never come back here as Adviser” (pp. 29–30).
- Langham-Carter’s 12 July 1915 memorandum alleged the Sultan was a “cousin of sorts” to the rebel leader To’ Janggut through his mother’s side and had been “not less sympathetic to the rebels whom he now denounces vaguely”—a claim found only in the Singapore National Archives copy (HCD 167/1915), as page 9 of the Colonial Office copy is missing (p. 28).
- The Sultan of Terengganu’s party arrived in Kota Bahru on 3 May 1915 with an entourage that Morkill’s diary records as including 300 spearmen and supporters, though this figure is unconfirmed by British official sources (p. 10).
Conclusion
Cheah’s definitive takeaway is that the Sultan of Kelantan’s “double game” was a risky but ultimately successful exercise in political survival under British protection. By alternately cooperating with and obstructing the British Adviser, and by strategically presenting his case directly to the Governor in Singapore, the Sultan managed to have Langham-Carter removed and replaced by the more accommodating R.J. Farrer. The article concludes that the Sultan’s ambivalence—sympathetic to the rebels’ tax grievances yet willing to impose severe punitive measures once the rebellion collapsed—was a rational strategy for preserving royal autonomy within the constraints of the protectorate system, and that this precedent may have influenced the later Terengganu revolts.
Context
- Primary archival collections: British Colonial Office records (C.O.273 series), the British Adviser’s files in Kelantan (Kel. PB. and Kel. K series) at Arkib Negara Malaysia, the Singapore National Archives (HCD 167/1915), and the private Morkill diary at Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
- Historiographical contribution: The article fills a gap identified in Gullick’s Rulers and Residents (1992) and Shahril Talib’s History of Kelantan (1995), both of which either footnote or entirely omit the Sultan-Adviser conflict. Cheah’s reinterpretation of the Sultan’s official transcripts as expressing “ambivalence” rather than “compliance” challenges the standard reading of British colonial sources in the protectorate states.