Article

Donald Stephens and Sabah’s Response to the Singapore Separation

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Donald Stephens and Sabah’s Response to the Singapore Separation

Abstract

The internal dynamics of the Federation of Malaysia changed with the departure of Singapore on 9 August 1965, leaving political leaders in Sabah uncertain about the future. On August 23rd, The Sabah Times published an editorial denying that Sabah had any interest in seceding from the federation. The editorial stated the official position of Donald Stephens, a prominent Sabah politician and owner of The Sabah Times, but the diplomatic correspondence of several British Commonwealth countries shows that it did not reflect Stephens’ true feelings. This article discusses events during the 14-day period between Singapore’s separation from Malaysia and publication of the editorial. It shows that Sabah’s leaders, and Stephens in particular, seriously contemplated leaving the federation but were dissuaded by a lack of support from Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and by a strong stance of the government in Kuala Lumpur.

Summary

This article examines the fourteen-day period between Singapore’s forced separation from the Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965 and the publication of a Sabah Times editorial on 23 August that publicly denied any secessionist intentions by Sabah’s leaders. Wong argues that the editorial belied the true sentiments of Donald Stephens, the Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs and proprietor of the newspaper, who seriously contemplated leading Sabah out of the federation. The core argument is that public statements and the documentary record tell fundamentally different stories: while official channels presented a calm acceptance of the new federal configuration, diplomatic correspondence reveals that Stephens and his party, UPKO, actively pursued a negotiated withdrawal and sought support from British, Australian, and New Zealand diplomats.

The article draws on previously unconsulted diplomatic cables from the British, Australian, and New Zealand high commissions in Kuala Lumpur to reconstruct the sequence of events. These sources show that Stephens’ secessionist impulse was driven by two factors: a personal sense of humiliation at being presented with a fait accompli, and a structural argument that Sabah’s original rationale for joining Malaysia—as a counterweight to Singapore’s Chinese population—had evaporated with Singapore’s departure. The Commonwealth countries’ responses, particularly Britain’s explicit refusal to extend defence guarantees to an independent Sabah, proved decisive in dissuading Stephens from proceeding.

Key Findings

  • On 13 August 1965, New Zealand High Commissioner Hunter Wade reported that Stephens was “half disposed to resign, or should he lead a move to take Sabah out of Malaysia now?” and that Sarawak’s Chief Minister Stephen Kalong Ningkan was “50/50” on following his lead (p. 10).
  • The UPKO National Council meeting on 16 August 1965 resolved that Sabah’s entry into Malaysia should be reviewed; Stephens offered to resign as party president before the council refused his resignation and affirmed its faith in his leadership (p. 10).
  • On 17 August 1965, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations instructed Lord Head that Britain would not continue to safeguard independent Sabah and Sarawak indefinitely, and that British troops in Sabah were “solely for the defence of Malaysia against Indonesia” and “not available for bringing secessionists to heel” (p. 15).
  • Tun Razak told Lord Head on 17 August that “the first man the Indonesians would hang would be Stephens himself” if Sabah seceded (p. 16).
  • The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed his High Commissioner on 18 August 1965 to “use every opportunity open to you to try to ensure that the Tunku does his utmost to keep remnants of Malaysia together” (p. 15).
  • Tunku Abdul Rahman arrived in Jesselton on 21 August 1965 and warned publicly that agitators for secession would be dealt with as “traitors to Malaysia” (p. 17).

Conclusion

Wong concludes that behind the public denial of secessionist intentions lay a genuine and serious attempt by Stephens to lead Sabah out of the federation, dissuaded only by the refusal of Commonwealth powers to provide defence guarantees and by Tunku’s firm public stance. The author resists the interpretation that Stephens used secession merely as a bargaining chip to regain the Chief Ministership, arguing instead that his conduct was driven by a sincere belief that the foundational rationale for Sabah’s membership had been destroyed by Singapore’s departure.

Context

  • Primary archival collections: The National Archives, Kew (TNA) and Australian National Archives, Canberra (ANA), particularly diplomatic cables from the British, Australian, and New Zealand high commissions in Kuala Lumpur during August 1965.
  • Historiographical contribution: The article corrects the understatement in existing literature—most notably Margaret Roff’s reference to “some talk of secession”—by demonstrating through previously unconsulted diplomatic correspondence that secession was actively pursued and nearly realised, not merely discussed in abstract terms.

References