British foreign policy and the extraterritorial question in Siam 1891–1900
J. Chandran’s 1965 article examines how Britain modified its extraterritorial privileges in Siam between 1891 and 1900, a period defined by acute Anglo-French rivalry over Siamese territory and the growing administrative burden of protecting a large population of Asian-origin British subjects. Chandran’s central thesis is that significant concessions were made well before the 1904 Anglo-French Entente, driven not by a single diplomatic impulse but by the converging pressures of consular overstretch, Siamese leverage through the Perak-Reman boundary dispute, and the India Office’s sustained resistance to extending Treaty rights to subjects of Asian origin.
Summary
The article traces the evolution of British extraterritorial policy in Siam from the Bowring Treaty of 1855 through the Registration Agreement of 1899 and the Taxation Agreement of 1900. Chandran identifies a fundamental structural problem that distinguished Siam from China and Japan: the vast majority of “British subjects” in Siam were not Europeans but Burmese, Shan, and other Asian immigrants whose presence was a by-product of British commercial expansion in the teak forests and gem mines of northern Siam. This demographic reality created an administrative and financial burden on a modestly staffed consular establishment while simultaneously depriving the Siamese Government of jurisdiction over a large proportion of its own population.
The narrative is organised around three interlocking threads: the expansion and reorganisation of the consular establishment in response to French activity in eastern and northern Siam; the negotiation of a registration policy that would limit the transmission of British protection to subsequent generations of Asian-origin subjects; and the abrogation of the 1856 Taxation Schedule, which had frozen Siamese land taxation at obsolete rates and rendered the Government financially dependent on gambling, spirit, and opium farms. Chandran demonstrates that these threads were not pursued as a coherent programme but emerged piecemeal from the interaction between the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Treasury, and the diplomatic representatives at Bangkok. The Siamese Government, particularly under Prince Devawongse and King Chulalongkorn, exploited the Perak-Reman boundary dispute as leverage to extract concessions that the Foreign Office had been reluctant to offer voluntarily.
Primary sources from the Foreign Office Siam files (F.O. 69), the Foreign Office Confidential Print series, and India Office Political and Secret Home Correspondence allow Chandran to reconstruct the internal deliberations that shaped policy. The correspondence reveals persistent tensions between the Foreign Office’s desire for a moderate, politically expedient approach and the rigid legal interpretations offered by the Law Officers of the Crown, as well as the India Office’s consistent preference for limiting rather than extending Treaty privileges.
Key Findings
- A total of 9,281 British subjects had been registered in Siam since 1887, of whom 381 were born in Siam; countless others remained unregistered, and the French were suspected of registering far larger numbers of Siamese subjects of Cambodian and Annamite stock (pp. 301–302).
- The Indian Government contributed Rs. 15,020 per annum towards the Chiengmai Vice-Consulate under a March 1891 arrangement, but flatly refused to bear any share of additional consular expenditure, forcing the Treasury to fund new appointments from savings in the Diplomatic and Consular Vote (pp. 293–295).
- The Chiengmai International Court’s jurisdiction was extended in 1896 to five additional districts—Raheng, Sawankalok, Utaradit, Sukotai, and Pichai—formally announced by de Bunsen on 29 September 1896 and accepted by Prince Devawongse (p. 297).
- Rivett Carnac, the Siamese Financial Adviser, demonstrated in an August 1899 memorandum that average taxation in Burma was nearly 200% higher than in Siam, that the silver coins in which the 1856 Schedule assessed taxes had fallen in value by more than 100%, and that land values in Siam had risen by nearly 300% (p. 310).
- The Anglo-Siamese Registration Agreement was signed on 29 November 1899 and the Anglo-Siamese Taxation Agreement on 20 September 1900; the latter abrogated the 1856 Schedule and, by virtue of most-favoured-nation clauses, simultaneously deprived all other Powers of their nominal land-tax privileges (pp. 309–311).
- The Perak-Reman Boundary Agreement, signed on 29 November 1899, was the principal lever the Siamese used to extract the taxation concession; Salisbury formally assured Chulalongkorn on 22 November 1899 that Britain would take steps to meet Siamese wishes on taxation once the boundary was settled (p. 310).
Conclusion
Chandran concludes that British extraterritorial concessions of 1899–1900 cannot be reduced to a single explanatory framework. While the Foreign Office at times treated the question as part of the broader diplomatic contest with France, and while the Siamese themselves demanded concessions as a quid pro quo for accepting British designs in the Malay peninsula, the most decisive factor was the persistent opposition of the India Office to extending Treaty privileges to subjects of Asian origin. Legal necessities, Chandran argues, were ultimately subordinated to the exigencies of general policy, and the 1899 Registration Agreement represented the first major step toward the abolition of the most onerous consequences of extraterritoriality in Siam.
Context
- The study draws primarily on unpublished Foreign Office records (F.O. 69 series), Foreign Office Confidential Print files, and India Office Political and Secret Home Correspondence held at the Public Record Office, London, supplemented by British and Foreign State Papers.
- Historiographically, the article challenges the then-prevailing view (associated with V. Purcell’s 1964 JMBRAS article) that the 1904 Anglo-French Entente was the proximate cause of the abandonment of extraterritorial privileges, demonstrating instead that the substantive modifications occurred a full four years earlier and were driven by distinct administrative and political pressures.