An incident in the history of Malacca under Portuguese rule
B. S. Mee’s 1928 contribution to the Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society is a reprint of a passage from the 1664 English translation (by Sir Peter Wyche) of Jacinto Freire de Andrade’s Portuguese biography of Dom John de Castro, the Fourth Vice-Roy of India (1542–1548). The passage recounts a naval crisis at Portuguese Malacca in the 1540s, in which a night raid by the King of Achem, a subsequent fleet engagement off Queda (Kedah), and a deceptive diplomatic overture by a confederation of Malay rulers were all resolved in favour of the Portuguese garrison.
Summary
The article presents a single narrative episode from the vice-royalty of Dom John de Castro, framed as a study in Portuguese imperial strategy in the Strait of Malacca. The central tension is between the military vulnerability of the Malacca fortress and the diplomatic manoeuvring of its neighbours. When the King of Viantata (Vijaya) and allied rulers of Queda and Pam (Pahang) formed a league ostensibly to settle a dispute between themselves, the Portuguese commander Simaon de Mello correctly identified the strategic danger: a war between these rulers would drain their resources and leave them more dependent on Portuguese protection. His decision to arbitrate rather than take sides was a calculated policy of divide-and-rule.
The narrative then shifts to the King of Achem, who conducted a nocturnal landing in Malacca’s port—a symbolic act of defiance rather than a genuine assault. The resulting panic among the civilian population was quelled by the presence of St. Francis Xavier, who reportedly entered an ecstatic state during a sermon on the day of the battle and announced the Portuguese victory before news arrived. The fleet, commanded by Dom Francisco d’Esa, pursued the Achem fleet to Queda despite a mutiny among the soldiers over provisions, and achieved a decisive victory in a river engagement where the enemy’s resistance was described as uniformly suicidal.
The final layer of the narrative involves a deceptive peace overture from the Viantata confederates, who sent an envoy ostensibly to offer military aid against Achem but in reality to gauge the garrison’s strength and morale. Simaon de Mello saw through the ruse and responded with a counter-stratagem, claiming the fleet had already won a victory and that the fortress was well supplied. The envoy, discredited, reported back that the governor either knew their design or was beyond fear.
Key Findings
- The source text is the 1664 London edition of Sir Peter Wyche’s English translation of Jacinto Freire de Andrade’s Life of Dom John de Castro, printed by Henry Herringman at the sign of the Anchor, New Exchange (p. 58).
- Simaon de Mello, Commander of Malacca, dispatched Diogo Soarez de Mello from the haven of Patane (Pattani) with two galleys to reinforce the fortress upon learning of the Malay confederation (p. 58).
- The King of Achem, commanding twenty great vessels, landed at night in Malacca’s port and withdrew without engaging the garrison, causing widespread panic among the civilian population (p. 59).
- The Portuguese squadron, under Dom Francisco d’Esa, sailed eight days without contact before learning the enemy was anchored at Queda, a further two days’ voyage; the soldiers mutinied over exhausted provisions before the engagement (pp. 59–60).
- In the river battle near the city of Parlez, Diogo Soarez de Mello boarded the enemy Admiral Galley with fifty soldiers; all the Muslim defenders were killed, not one surrendering (p. 60).
- Francis Xavier, then in Malacca, reportedly entered an ecstatic state during a sermon on the day of the battle and announced the victory to the congregation before any news had arrived from the fleet (pp. 61–62).
Conclusion
Mee’s reprint preserves a vivid early-modern account of Portuguese naval warfare and diplomatic intelligence-gathering in the Strait of Malacca during the 1540s. The passage illustrates how the Portuguese garrison at Malacca, though small, maintained dominance through a combination of strategic patience, naval mobility, and the exploitation of rivalries among Malay polities—while the interweaving of Francis Xavier’s prophetic vision with the military narrative reveals the devotional framework through which contemporary Portuguese authors understood imperial success.
Context
- The article is a straightforward reprint of a 17th-century source with no original archival research or historiographical commentary by Mee; its value lies in making this passage available to the MBRAS readership.
- The source text reflects the colonial Portuguese perspective unmediated by modern critical analysis: Malay rulers are characterised in terms of cowardice and treachery, and the role of Francis Xavier is presented in hagiographic terms consistent with his canonisation (1622) and the devotional culture of the period.